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Autistic Heterogeneity: Linking
Uncertainties and Indeterminacies
GREGORY HOLLIN
School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK
ABSTRACT Autism is a highly uncertain entity and little is said about it with any degree
of certainty. Scientists must, and do, work through these uncertainties in the course of their
work. Scientists explain uncertainty in autism research through discussion of
epistemological uncertainties which suggest that diverse methods and techniques make
results hard to reconcile, ontological uncertainties which suggest doubt over taxonomic
coherence, but also through reference to autism’s indeterminacy which suggests that
the condition is inherently heterogeneous. Indeed, indeterminacy takes two forms—an
inter-personal form which suggests that there are fundamental differences between
individuals with autism and an intra-personal form which suggests that no one factor is
able to explain all features of autism within a given individual. What is apparent in the
case of autism is that scientists put uncertainty and indeterminacy into discussion with
one another and, rather than a well-policed epistemic-ontic boundary, there is a
movement between, and an entwinement of, the two. Understanding scientists’ dialogue
concerning uncertainty and indeterminacy is of importance for understanding autism
and autistic heterogeneity but also for understanding uncertainty and ‘uncertainty
work’ within science more generally.
KEYWORDS: autism, neuroscience, psychology, uncertainty work, indeterminacy work
Introduction
Autism was first described by Kanner (1943) and consists of a dyad of socio-com-
municative impairments and restricted interests and repetitive behaviours (Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 50). Over the last 30 years autism has
become:
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. . . the condition of fascination of the moment, occupying a number of cul-
tural locations that reflect a spectrum of wonder and nervousness—the allure
of potentially unquantifiable human difference and the nightmare of not
somehow being “fully” human. (Murray, 2008, p. 5)
Occupying such a position, autism has attracted a significant amount of attention,
not only from the natural and medical sciences but also the creative industries
(autism fiction now being a recognised genre), the humanities, and the social
sciences.
With regard to the social sciences in particular, I suggest that there are at least
three reasons why autism holds a particular interest. First, autism has been
described as the key diagnosis of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries
(Nadesan, 2005, p. 3), a ‘living experiment in concept formation of a sort that does
not come more than once in a dozen lifetimes’ (Hacking, 2009, p. 506). Second,
that living experiment has quite clearly been shaped by a range of factors that are
taken to be archetypical of much contemporary scientific practice; factors as
diverse as increased surveillance over childhood (Rose, 1985, p. 176; Armstrong,
1995, p. 396; Be´hague and Le´ze´, 2015), deinstitutionalisation (Eyal et al., 2010;
Evans, 2013), contemporary disciplines such as molecular genetics (Navon,
2011; Navon and Eyal, 2014) and neuroscience (Fitzgerald, 2013; Hollin and
Pilnick, 2015), and the experience and expertise of lay groups including parents
and (self-)advocates (Silverman, 2012; Hart, 2014). Third, and this is the focus
of the current article, despite significant levels of investment (Pellicano et al.,
2013) autism science is remarkable because it is just so uncertain.
It is well recognised, for example, that during the 1990s there was an ‘epidemic’
of autism diagnoses (Eyal et al., 2010, p. 2) with prevalence rates increasing from
around 4:10,000 in 1978 (Wing and Potter, 2002, p. 151) to approximately 1:100
in 2009 (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009, p. 500). Yet there is little agreement on the
cause of this increase and assortative mating (Baron-Cohen, 2006), diagnostic
substitution (Bishop et al., 2008), and environmental risk factors (Weintraub,
2011) have all been proposed as possible factors. Similarly lacking in explanation
is the 4:1 male-to-female ratio in diagnoses (Fombonne, 2009) a finding which,
again, has been attributed to basic biology (Baron-Cohen et al., 2011) and more
complex social factors (Cheslack-Postava and Jordan-Young, 2011).
Most obviously, however, this claim of ubiquitous uncertainty in autism relates
to the fact that not only is there no cure for autism, but also that the condition’s
cause and manifestation remain hotly contested. To give a flavour; there is signifi-
cant disagreement over the links between autism, intellectual disability, attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder, and other forms of psychiatric diagnosis (Skuse,
2007; Ronald and Hoekstra, 2011); whether traits associated with autism are
found in the general population (Bailey et al., 1998; Frazier et al., 2010); and
as to whether autism should be understood as a form of psychopathology at all
(Kapp et al., 2013).
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Perhaps most strikingly, there is an uncertainty as to whether autism symptoms
have a common cause or whether they are ‘fractionable’ (Constantino et al., 2004;
Happe´ and Ronald, 2008). It is now widely suggested within the scientific litera-
ture that it is ‘time to give up on a single explanation for autism’ (Happe´ et al.,
2006) and that autism should be characterised as a condition of ‘the idiosyncratic
brain’ (Hahamy et al., 2015). This is a debate related to the idea of autistic hetero-
geneity and denotes the claim that there may be no one thing which unites all indi-
viduals diagnosed with autism (what I will call inter-personal heterogeneity) and
that there may be no one thing that explains all symptoms within a particular indi-
vidual (here called intra-personal heterogeneity).
Drawing upon interview data, in this article I ask two questions relating to these
matters. First, how do scientists understand, and then cope with, uncertainties
when studying autism? Second, what is the relationship between these uncertain-
ties and claims made about autistic heterogeneity? A core argument is that discus-
sions of scientific uncertainty and autistic heterogeneity are entangled with each
other. The indeterminacy of autism shapes scientific talk and practice and is
used by scientists to explain the uncertain state of autism science (I call this ‘inde-
terminacy work’). Simultaneously, I suggest, uncertain science has legitimated
and stabilised a heterogeneous autism. Thus, epistemology and ontology can be
understood to bleed into, and diffuse through, one another.
Analytical Perspective
An increasing body of social scientific literature has sought to understand the role
of uncertainty in science, detailing the undertaking of ‘practical uncertainty work’
which allows research to remain ‘doable’ by disarming, displacing, and deflating
uncertainty (Webster and Eriksson, 2008; Moreira et al., 2009; Pickersgill, 2014;
Gardner et al., 2015). For example, Star highlights (1985, p. 406) four forms of
uncertainty—taxonomic, diagnostic, political, and technical—encountered by
nineteenth century neurologists and details numerous forms of work which
allows research to continue in the face of these difficulties. One of Star’s
central arguments is that this uncertainty work—and Star explicitly bases her
analysis within the sociology of work—is undertaken in order to transform numer-
ous ‘local uncertainties’ which plague every laboratory into ‘global certainties’
which are presented for a wider audience. Importantly, Star’s ‘wider audience’
is largely a scientific, rather than public, audience. Thus, Star’s analysis of uncer-
tainty stands in contrast to analyses of uncertainty in public, controversial fields
such as genetically modified crops (Levidow, 2001, p. 868) and climate change
(Demeritt, 2006, p. 463) wherein scientists may be required to adopt an ‘argumen-
tative stance’. In controversial fields such as these it may be that ‘the issue of
uncertainty is a strategic element of argument rather than something which
causes argument’ (Campbell, 1985, p. 447). This less obviously so for Star,
who stresses that the uncertainty work undertaken in her case is not deliberately
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manipulative as much as it is a mundane and ‘inextricable part of scientific work
organization’ (Star, 1985, p. 415).
There are thus important differences here between the work of Star and Shack-
ley and Wynne (1996) who examine uncertainty work in a policy context and
focus upon the capacity of uncertainty work to act as a ‘boundary ordering
device’ which reconciles uncertainty and scientific authority. While the current
case bears more resemblance to Star’s—firstly, because autistic heterogeneity is
not a significant policy issue and, secondly, because the stakes during qualitative
interview, wherein these data were collected, are lower than in policy debate—
there are nonetheless important and relevant methods for reducing uncertainty
in science noted by Shackley andWynne. First, scientists may attempt to quell dis-
cussion of uncertainty by promising to reduce it in the future. Second, there may
be an attempt made to clarify and manage uncertainty by, for example, containing
uncertainty within error bars or circumscribing uncertainty within a narrow aca-
demic field (see also; Decoteau and Underman, 2015, p. 473). Third, a conden-
sation of uncertainty may take place so that one form of uncertainty is
recognised while another is systematically ignored (see also; Edwards, 1999,
p. 462). Fourth:
If the “responsibility” for a major unresolved uncertainty can be firmly
located within another discipline, policy domain, or social world, then the
work of reducing uncertainty can effectively be displaced (cf. Pinch,
1981) and the uncertainty ceases to threaten the authority of the scientific
community. (Shackley and Wynne, 1996, p. 290)
Thus, there may be a displacement of uncertainty into other disciplines (see also;
Pinch, 1981, p. 155).
As discussed above, scholars have stressed that on occasion scientists seek not
to disarm or deflate uncertainty but, rather, to actively exploit it; uncertainties ‘can
be, and have been, employed as political resources’ as Paul Edwards notes (1999,
p. 439). Mellor (2010), for example, discusses the public management of uncer-
tainty in relation to the possibility of an asteroid strike and suggests that on
occasion uncertainty is promoted by scientists in order to procure research
funds. Similarly, McGoey calls attention to the ‘generative and performative
nature of uncertainty’, claiming that when ‘a situation is uncertain, it demands
attention, debate, funding, and most crucially, experts to determine how the situ-
ation should be resolved’ (McGoey, 2009, p. 155). Uncertainty may, then, be used
strategically to maintain authority, legitimacy, and research funding (Shackley
and Wynne, 1996, p. 280, 282; Zehr, 2000, p. 98; Moreira et al., 2009, p. 675).
It should be clear from this discussion that the term ‘uncertainty work’ refers to
a wide range of practices and does not necessarily imply any deliberate obfusca-
tion. Certainly, some of the literature cited above seems to detail fairly straightfor-
ward instances of what Peter Galison calls an ‘antiepistemology’ where attempts
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are made to ensure that politically problematic uncertainties are ‘covered and
obscured’ by those acting in the ‘art of nontransmission’ (2004, p. 237). Such
intentionality is certainly not claimed in other instances (e.g. Demeritt, 2001,
p. 347), and instead what is detailed are honest attempts to make work ‘doable’
(Fujimura, 1987). What this literature does insist upon is that uncertainty and
work undertaken to reduce, manage, or understand it can be performative and gen-
erative; of authority, funds, objects of investigation or, of course, certainty. This
generative potential of uncertainty is particularly evident in discussions of uncer-
tainty in autism and the human sciences.
Uncertainty and Autism
There is good evidence that uncertainty, and uncertainty work, plays an important
role in both autism research and in other fields concerned with psychopathology.
Fitzgerald, for example, interviewed a number of psychiatrists and psychologists
who were concerned with autism and utilised various neuroscientific method-
ologies in the course of their investigations. During these encounters Fitzgerald
describes scientists who have ‘not only a sense of hope, but also a much more
ambivalent and uncertain attitude to the future of autism neuroscience’ (Fitzger-
ald, 2014, p. 256) and, in language reminiscent of McGoey, claims that ‘“low
expectation” is a generative force within bioscience . . . allowing neuroscientists
to enact and sustain projects that have an in-built ambiguity or uncertainty’(Fitz-
gerald, 2014, pp. 258–259).
While in many senses quite different to Fitzgerald’s work, Decoteau and
Underman (2015) also stress the generative potential of uncertainty and uncer-
tainty work in relation to autism. Decoteau and Underman examine a high
profile legal case in the United States wherein plaintiffs—led by individuals
who may commonly be understood as ‘heterodox’ or ‘fringe’ scientists
(Collins, 2014)—‘painted the field of autism science as wholly uncertainty’
(Decoteau and Underman, 2015, p. 473). These individuals argued that it was
entirely plausible that the administration of vaccines caused at least some
instances of autism. High profile, orthodox, respondents with significant ‘scien-
tific authority capital’ (Decoteau and Underman, 2015, p. 480), however, sought
to ‘circumscribe uncertainty surrounding autism in order to refocus attention on
the potentialities of the genome’. Such strategies, the authors argue, were suc-
cessful and ‘played a role in clinching and shoring up scientific hegemony on
broader issues in autism causation and in steering research development’ (Deco-
teau and Underman, 2015, p. 473). Regardless of the merits of specific claims
made by Decoteau and Underman concerning the evidence given by various
respondents (e.g. Decoteau and Underman, 2015, p. 491), the authors certainly
detail a clear example of the clarification and management of uncertainty
(Shackley and Wynne, 1996, p. 281) in autism and argue for the performative
potential of such uncertainty work.
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Striking a cord with much of the above work which emphasises the performa-
tive potential of scientists’ uncertainty work, it is particularly noteworthy that
research which has considered uncertainty within the human sciences has
shown that epistemological uncertainties can manifest themselves in ontological
realities. Discussing Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), for example, Moreira
et al., state that:
prodromal dementia categories were positioned as possible re-articulations
between different laboratories –molecular biology, neuropathology, neuroi-
maging, and so forth –and the clinic, in an attempt to ‘cool down’ or stabilize
some of the uncertainties [in the field]. (2009, p. 671)
The suggestion here, therefore, is that MCI has emerged as a placeholder and as
part of an attempt to ‘cool down’ interdisciplinary tensions, dispute, and uncer-
tainties. The very nature of MCI, therefore, may be radically shaped by broader
uncertainties within the sciences of dementia. Similarly Pickersgill suggests that
epistemic and ontological uncertainties can be off-set with reference to one
another, ultimately ensuring that ‘[diagnostic tools] and the psychopathologies
they purport to identify become tightly bound together, co-producing the epis-
temological and ontological coherence of both mental health categories and
their diagnostic criteria’ (Pickersgill, 2011, p. 84).
In this article, and drawing upon interview data with leading psychologists and
neuroscientists researching autism, I build upon the above literature and its con-
sideration of the performative potential of uncertainty in the human sciences. I
show, firstly, that during interviews autism scientists openly discuss various
forms of uncertainty. However I also argue that when attempting to account for
the recalcitrance of this uncertainty researchers engage in discussion of ‘autistic
heterogeneity’, a concept which locates uncertainty within autism itself and
suggests that autism is, by nature, indeterminate. Following others (e.g.
Hacking, 1995, p. 234; Barad, 2007, pp. 115, 265) I am here differentiating uncer-
tainty and indeterminacy in the following the manner: The term ‘uncertainty’
denotes epistemological claims like ‘I am unsure if autism is a real thing’. The
term indeterminacy, by contrast, is used to mark claims like ‘I am sure that
autism is multifaceted’. I argue here that these terms are entwined in autism
research for, while a significant amount of methodological and conceptual uncer-
tainty is discussed, reference to autistic heterogeneity also marks a certain claim
that autism is a condition determined by its indeterminacy.
In this article, among the first to systematically interrogate the core concept of
autistic heterogeneity, I seek to show that autistic heterogeneity is a far from stable
concept and is intimately related to a particularly striking form of uncertainty
work wherein scientific uncertainties are taken to be inherent in the nature of
autism. I conclude the article by thinking about the consequences of this particular
understanding of autism.
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Uncertainty and the Importance of Research Context
As is evident from the above discussion, one re-occurring finding in relation to
uncertainty is that audience and context matters. The testimonies of experts ana-
lysed by Decoteau and Underman suggest that autism is a consistent diagnosis
with qualitatively distinct abnormalities (2015, p. 488). By contrast, the talk of
neuroscientists interviewed by Fitzgerald is marked by the consistent presence
of uncertainty and ambivalence. Autism appears to be, then, more than one
even if it is ultimately less than many (Mol, 2002, p. 55).
Method and space is crucial to understanding these differences. Pinch, in a
study examining the negotiation of uncertainty in solar neutrino science, states
that when considering what scientists say:
one constraint is the potential audience for comments on certainty . . . when
scientists perceive a possible public audience they tend to act defensively
and stress the certainty of their own areas—while, at the same time, doubting
the certainty of others. (1981, p. 155)
Others have supported this conclusion suggesting that, while scientists may indeed
discuss uncertainty publically, there is an attempt to manage its nature in public
forums (Zehr, 2000; Moreira et al., 2009; Mellor, 2010; Hollin and Pearce,
2015). This conclusion may go some way to explaining the certainty of the testi-
mony examined by Decoteau and Underman which is, in some ways, at odds of
with so many other statements of uncertainty in autism research. Previous
research, drawing on Pinch, suggests that when researchers are placed into an
adversarial, ‘argumentative stance’, ‘there is a strong tendency for critics to
accentuate uncertainty and for defenders to claim more solid knowledge’ (Camp-
bell, 1985, p. 448). The courtroom, then, may engender itself to particular state-
ments that would be less readily found in other settings.
With regard to interview methods, Pinch considers it probable that he and his
readership are considered a public audience and, thus, that the scientists he
spoke to during interviews acted defensively during questioning. Fitzgerald
reaches quite different conclusions, arguing that his interviews reflect ‘mundane
and private reflections of neuroscientists who are working to understand and
articulate their own scientific practice, in the midst of more or less low stakes
and anonymous conversation’ (2014, p. 253). Thus, Fitzgerald concludes that:
I do not see ambiguity in this piece as a rhetorical strategy that papers over
the cracks. Nor do I see it as an attempt to co-opt opponents who (rightly)
worry about where research is going. I see it as a way to think seriously
about the complex biosocial space of autism diagnosis and research. I inter-
pret it, finally, as an honest attempt to think, work and live through the sheer
complexity of this emerging and growing field. (Fitzgerald, 2014, p. 258)
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I am reluctant to pick between these two positions at the outset and rather suspect
that both contain some truth, that relations during the interviews I conducted were
‘mobile, reversible, and unstable’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 292). Nonetheless, it is
absolutely essential to give a sense of the project in hand in order to better under-
stand the data.
Context of the Present Study
While methodological details of this project have been published in detail else-
where (Hollin and Pilnick, 2015, p. 280) several aspects of the study are particu-
larly important in the present context. First, neither uncertainty nor
heterogeneity were issues of a priori concern for this project, although the
fact that there are a plethora of viewpoints and competing claims surrounding
autism was a determining factor in electing to study the condition. This was
also a rationale behind the use of qualitative interview as a tool to elicit
these wide-ranging views. Second, while the project was designed to be socio-
logical in nature, my first and Masters degrees were obtained in psychology. At
the time of the interviews I was also being co-supervised for my Ph.D. studies
by an autism neuroscientist known to most, if not all, of the participants. This
information was not withheld from participants and was, on occasion, a topic of
discussion. As noted, existing research has argued that prospective audience is
an important determining factor in discussions of uncertainty and, while it is
debatable as to whether my positioning makes these conversations more or
less public, that position is worthy of notation even if we are left to speculate
on the precise consequences.
The extracts presented here have been anonymised and conclude with a note
of both the interviewee’s academic position and the interview number (e.g. Pro-
fessor, interview 9) although analysis revealed no evidence of systematic
differences between academics of different levels of seniority. Some extracts
also include my own dialogue and those sections are preceded by an ‘I:’.
The interviewee’s response during these interactional extracts is preceded by
an acronym based upon their academic position (e.g. PD for Postdoctoral
Researcher).
The subsections into which I have divided the data, below, emerged during
analysis and each concern a form of uncertainty, or uncertainty work, dis-
cussed during the interviews. These sections do not mark pre-existing cat-
egories as understood by my interviewees. Interviewees did not discuss
these topics separately from one another and I do not wish to suggest,
through the creation of these thematic subsections, that they should be under-
stood as being entirely independent. The purpose of pulling part these threads
in the analysis is so that one might be able to trace those threads back and
examine their interdependent and tightly knotted existence in the discourse
of these researchers.
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Epistemic Uncertainty and a Higgledy-Piggled Science
The first discussion of uncertainty within the research interviews pertains to a
form of uncertainty which arises from an attempt to integrate numerous,
diverse, scientific methods when studying autism. As discussed above, these
questions relate to what Pickersgill has called ‘epistemic uncertainty’ and,
broadly, what Star named ‘technical uncertainty’, where uncertainty has ‘devel-
oped as a result of inadequate tools or ambiguous information about techniques’
(Star, 1985, p. 403).
It is certainly true that the number of cognitive tests used to explore autism has
exploded and that interviewees in the current study suggested that the sheer range
of tests, and the differences between them, lead to contradictory findings and a sig-
nificant degree of epistemic uncertainty. A Research Fellow, for example,
states that:
. . . I mean the experiments that are used are hugely mixed, erm, the samples
that are used varies, the mental state that you’re looking at varies, whether
you look at something like a belief versus an intention. So it’s really not sur-
prising that there’s not a huge amount of agreement. (Research Fellow, inter-
view 4)
According to this researcher, uncertainty arises because scientists are examining
different ‘mental states’, such as ‘belief’ and ‘intention’, and doing so through a
‘hugely mixed’ set of experimental paradigms; these diverse paradigms, it is
reported, yield wildly different results.
A similar claim is made by an Associate Professor who states that ‘ . . . you look
at other areas and it becomes much more higgledy-piggled what people have used,
and the task they’ve used and how they’ve measured it’ (Associate Professor,
interview 11). Two things are of note in this extract. The first is that, as in the pre-
vious extract, which identified an epistemic uncertainty within the vast array of
scientific practices concerned with autism, there is an assertion here that cognitive
psychology has become ‘much more higgledy-piggled’ and it is this ‘hugely
mixed’ set of experimental paradigms which ensure a lack of certainty. A
second feature of this extract is that there is a very obvious piece of ‘uncertainty
work’ in that there is a displacement of uncertainty into ‘other areas’ and ‘people’,
meaning other researchers (Pinch, 1981; Shackley and Wynne, 1996). It is not the
Associate Professor’s own work from which uncertainty flows but allied fields;
one might imagine that this displacement makes the Associate Professor’s own
research ‘doable’ as internal integrity is preserved.
It is not hard to find support for the claim, made by both of these interviewees,
that experimental diversity has increased significantly in recent decades. This
increasing diversity has been particularly marked following the introduction of
a vast range of biologically and neurologically based techniques during the
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1990s, the so-called ‘decade of the brain’ (Elam, 2015, p. 47). The claim within
these interviews was that the introduction of these new methods has led to conflict-
ing findings and a struggle to reconcile work between forms of analysis. These
struggles and anxieties are captured in the following metaphor, where a Professor
discusses attempts to integrate neuroscience with experimental psychology:
I mean I think there’s a kind of cultural, erm, narrative that says somehow or
other if we can nail it to bits of the brain that we understand it better, er, but
(exhales). Er, in fact the nails are not very tight, or deeply driven in, er,
they’re, they’re more speculative nails. (Professor, interview 7)
The inability to drive nails between different levels of analysis, in this instance
between cognitive psychology and neuroscience, may thus give the impression
of heterogeneity and this is a failing of psychology’s ‘cultural narrative’, the
assumption that biological levels necessarily ensure that ‘we understand it better’.
It needs to be noted that this Professor is not a significant user of neuroscientific
methods and we can thus posit that a particular form of uncertainty work is being
engaged in. As noted in the analytic perspective, Shackley and Wynne (1996,
p. 290) argue that one form uncertainty work involves attributing responsibility
for uncertainty to other disciplines or social worlds. This description seems appli-
cable to several of the extracts that have been presented here in relation to the epis-
temic uncertainties experienced during research into autism,
This conclusion appears to be at odds with that reached by Fitzgerald (2014), as
discussed in the analytic perspective. Fitzgerald reports upon the uncertainties dis-
cussed by autism neuroscientists and, while he does not seek to deploy a thematic
analysis akin to that being used here, most of the uncertainties discussed would be
considered epistemic in nature. Fitzgerald, firstly, dismisses the possibility that
discussions of uncertainty could be part of any ‘rhetorical strategy’ (Fitzgerald,
2014, p. 258) and, secondly, suggests that neuroscientists report ‘ambivalence
and uncertainty about their own practice’ (Fitzgerald, 2014, p. 244, italics
mine). In contrast, the evidence presented here suggests that, firstly, those
researching autism are likely to displace uncertainty within other arenas and, sec-
ondly, that such strategies may well be made in order to make their own work
doable by preserving the scientific integrity of its foundations.
Ontological Uncertainty Over ‘The Autisms’
The second discussion of uncertainty within the research interviews concerns an
uncertainty as to whether autism is a unitary ontological entity. This is a discussion
based around the classification of autism and the reliability and validity of that
classification. To return to the distinction introduced previously, this uncertainty
regarding the classification of autism is akin to what Star has called ‘taxonomic
uncertainty’ (Star, 1985, p. 397) and Pickersgill ‘ontological uncertainty’
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(Pickersgill, 2011, p. 74). Ontological uncertainty reflects a lack of confidence that
the label of autism denotes a homogenous, discrete population.
That the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition
(DSM-5) constructs psychiatric disorders as categorical rather than dimensional
in nature has, of course, been an issue of intense debate (e.g. Anckarsa¨ter,
2010) and this is a discussion from which autism has certainly not been exempt
(e.g. Skuse, 2012). Indeed, the idea that there is ‘no such thing as autism’, and
that disparate subgroups of quite different individuals were being lumped together
was a frequent claim within the research interviews. A Reader, for example, states
that ‘I don’t think there is one autism so to say what, what autism is, is I think a bit
of a (.) non-starter to be honest’ (Reader, interview 1). The same point is made by a
Research Fellow:
I: . . . if I was going to ask you what you think autism is, erm, how do you think it’s best
described?
RF: (.) Erm. I honestly think that it’s, at the moment, what we call autism is just a collec-
tion of many different subgroups. I don’t know, maybe this is controversial, I don’t
even know if there is such a thing. (Research Fellow, interview 12)
The lack of certainty in this interviewee’s answer seems evident. Nonetheless, the
argument being advanced here, and as with the Reader previously quoted, is that it
is unlikely that there is ‘such a thing’ as autism; a faulty prior classification has led
to a number of diverse groups of individuals being placed together.
The uncertain nature of autism as a classification is also discussed by a further
Research Fellow who states that ‘we’ve got this wonderful “the autisms” term that
everybody’s talking about and, no it’s the current very in thing’ (Research Fellow,
interview 5). It thus seems conceivable that a conceptual shift and reorientation,
whereby unity was sought at the genetic rather than behavioural or cognitive
level, could be necessary to reduce uncertainty in the field.
Discussion of ontological uncertainty in autism seems to be very much tied to
the context within which discussion takes place. As discussed in the above ana-
lytic perspective, in legal settings—where scientists have previously been reported
to present ‘more solid knowledge’ (Campbell, 1985, p. 448)—Decoteau and
Underman (2015, p. 488) find scientists who confidently describe autism as a con-
sistent diagnosis marked by qualitatively distinct abnormalities. Fitzgerald, by
comparison, interviewed researchers who show a marked amount of ‘ambivalence
and uncertainty’ about their own work (Fitzgerald, 2014, p. 244). That the current
thematic analysis arose from data emerging from within interviews is, then,
important. Nonetheless, discussions of ontological uncertainty in autism are not
restricted to ‘corridor talk’ and have, in fact, been formalised with discourse
(Rabinow, 1996, p. 50). The reference to ‘autisms’ made by the Research
Fellow in the above extract, for example, is directed towards a body of work
made popular by molecular geneticist Daniel Geschwind (e.g. Geschwind and
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Levitt, 2007) which suggests that there are numerous, distinct populations cur-
rently being labelled as autistic.
From Uncertainty to Indeterminacy
That discussions concerning uncertainty in autism are so widespread suggests
that the topic may be treated in an interesting way within autism science. None-
theless, the forms of uncertainty identified thus far are broadly similar to those in
other scientific domains; we see forms of uncertainty akin to those discussed by
Shackley and Wynne, Star, Pickersgill, and Pinch, as well as attempts to deal
with those uncertainties which, again, are recognised within the literature.
What is particularly interesting about the case of autism, however, is that along-
side these recognised forms of uncertainty and uncertainty work there is a further
narrative—that of autistic heterogeneity—wherein chance and uncertainty are
inherent to the autistic condition itself. This is a claim that autism is an indeter-
minate entity.
To return to a distinction discussed above, I have used the term uncertainty to
refer to claims such as ‘I am unsure if results from various techniques are compar-
able’ (epistemic uncertainty) and ‘I am unsure if individuals with autism make up
a single population’ (ontological uncertainty). The term indeterminacy, however,
refers to statements like ‘I am sure that autism is multifaceted’ which reflects a
belief about the state of the world rather than ways of knowing it.
A consideration of indeterminacy is of importance in its own right for, both
within the interviews and the literature, it is one of the central topics of concern
within contemporary autism research. A detailed, critical, reading of the concept
has yet to be conducted, however, and the analysis here may allow a better
‘vantage point’ (Pickersgill, 2011, p. 84) from which to comprehend the phenom-
enon. Moreover, an analysis of autistic heterogeneity is also important because, I
suggest, the indeterminacy of autism is used by scientists to explain why it is that
autism research continues to bemarked by the uncertainties and inconsistencies dis-
cussed above. This ‘indeterminacy work’ constitutes a form of uncertainty work;
scientific uncertainties are understood as being part of autism itself and scientific
work thus remains ‘doable’. This displacement of uncertainty is an example of
the entanglement of autism’s nature with its own investigation; uncertain science
is intimately related to an indeterminate autism. I use the following sections to jux-
tapose the foregoing discussions of epistemic and ontological uncertainty with the
various and diverse descriptions of indeterminacy provided by scientists during the
interviews and subsequently demarcated during analysis.
Indeterminacy and Autistic Heterogeneity
The notion of autistic heterogeneity, which has at its centre the claim that autism is
fundamentally indeterminate, was drawn on repeatedly throughout the interviews
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and described as one of the most significant features of autism as it is currently
understood. As one of the interviewees claimed, autism is best described as:
‘ . . . a multi-faceted thing that is quite hard to describe with, based on just one
core, one variable’ (Postdoctoral Researcher, interview 8). This view is echoed
by a further interviewee who thinks that the search for a grand theory of everything
is unlikely to be successful:
Well there is no one (.) model like the physicists have, there is no, er, there is
no one model that explains er, everything. Er, and I don’t think that we’ll get
one model that explains everything . . . (Assistant Professor, interview 6)
This interviewee, who has a background in the natural sciences, makes a bold
claim. Unlike the objects of physics there is no unitary essence to autism, ‘there
is no one model that explains everything’. It might be possible for one scientific
vision to capture completely the essence of atoms but something in the nature
of autism resists such classification. It can immediately be seen how these state-
ments differ from those offered in the previous sections—the uncertainty here
does not concern knowledge about autism, the uncertainty is inherent in autism
itself.
Interestingly, knowledge about autistic heterogeneity is described as increasing
over time—this is an uncertainty about which scientists are increasingly certain. In
the extract below a further interviewee, an Associate Professor, explains how they
are currently teaching undergraduates about the history of autism research and
how there had previously been a search for a ‘holy grail’ (Associate Professor,
interview 11) in psychology, one cognitive theory that would explain all the be-
havioural manifestations of autism. This, it is claimed, is a search which has
been largely abandoned:
I: So, (.) you do, you, so it’s not the case, you do think that there’s, there isn’t a holy grail
out there, do you think? It’s, it’s not.
L: Oh, I don’t think we’re going to, well, it’s just my personal opinion, I don’t, you know,
I don’t think there’s going to be one neat cognitive explanation. (Associate Professor,
interview 11)
While the interviewee is careful to frame their answer as ‘just their opinion’ it is
noticeable how closely the statement mirrors that of the Assistant Professor above;
that autism is always going to resist ‘one neat explanation’, at least at the cognitive
level.
This was a repeated claim within the interviews; ‘ . . . I mean autism is a very
heterogeneous condition, okay? I mean I think that’s pretty well accepted now,
it didn’t used to be . . . ’ (Professor, interview 13). Indeed, it is again important
to note, and as expressed in the words of a further Professor, that not only has
the search for the unitary core of autism at the cognitive or neurological level
failed up until this point, in all likelihood future attempts will also be futile:
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And there are clearly going to be, well there must be many, many different
causes in different individuals on the autism spectrum. Erm, whether those
will unify down to a final common pathway in terms of some brain
systems or some (.) interrupted neurodevelopmental processes (.), erm,
again I wouldn’, hmm, I don’t know how much money I would bet on that
((laughs)). (Professor, interview 18)
Within these extracts, coming from researchers spanning various institutions and
levels of seniority, we can see heterogeneity being positioned as an essential
aspect of autism itself, a condition with a fundamentally indeterminate nature.
These utterances should not necessarily be understood as part of a ‘sociology of
low expectations’ (Fitzgerald, 2014; Broer and Pickersgill, 2015; Gardner et al.,
2015) as researchers’ utterances are neither future-oriented nor do the claims
appear to be particularly ambivalent. Instead, in the above extracts one can find
the claim that the certaintyof science concerning autistic heterogeneity is increasing:
the search for the holy grail has been abandoned not because scientists have accepted
defeat but because they have come to understand the true, indeterminate nature of
autism. It ‘didn’t used to be’ accepted that autism is heterogeneous, but now it is.
There is thus an interesting paradox at the heart of autism research. In the pre-
vious sections we saw researchers describe an increasing number of uncertainties
in the field—increases attributed, in part, to a proliferation of experimental and
diagnostic techniques in the field. Simultaneously, autistic heterogeneity has
increased—there used to be a belief that there was one explanation for autism
but there no longer is. One might, therefore, expect heterogeneity to be understood
as some form of experimental artefact, a direct consequence of increased uncer-
tainty. This, however, is not the case; while researchers do acknowledge that
new methods have led a proliferation of uncertainty, when it comes to heterogen-
eity there is a decrease in uncertainty. Heterogeneity, it seems, is one of the few
certain areas of autism science.
Intra- and Inter-Personal Heterogeneity
Interestingly, within these discussions of the heterogeneity of autism, it is possible
to discern a further sub-division, with two separate types of heterogeneity able to
be teased apart during analysis. It is sometimes suggested that there is no common
bond between all individuals diagnosed with autism, that these people share no
common trait and that there is inter-individual heterogeneity present. Simul-
taneously, it is sometimes claimed that one theory may not be able to explain
all of a given individual’s symptoms; this is a model of intra-individual heterogen-
eity, whereby more than one theory is required to explain the appearance of autism
in any given individual. These two constructions of autism, that it is indeterminate
both within and between individuals, are found throughout the interview
transcripts.
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The concept of an inter-individual heterogeneity refers to the idea that individ-
uals with autism look very different to one another, genetically, neurologically,
cognitively, and behaviourally. For example, a Professor, states that:
But it just seems to me that autism is so heterogeneous. You know that, that,
that you’ve got, you know, in order to get, you know, you can give a diag-
nosis of autism using ADOS [Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, a
core diagnostic instrument] to someone who’s a Professor at Oxford and
somebody who sits in the corner and hand flaps. (Professor, interview 20)
In this extract we can see the now familiar claim that autism is heterogeneous.
However, we can also see that this heterogeneity is constructed inter-personally,
between a ‘Professor at Oxford’ and ‘someone who sits in the corner and hand
flaps’. A similar idea, that ‘everybody with autism is completely different to
everybody else with autism’ is expressed by a Reader, below:
when I’ve students and, and they come and work with me and say what have
you learned about autism they say well (.) all I’ve learned is that everybody
with autism is completely different to everybody else with autism ((laughs)).
(Reader, interview 1)
These extracts both unambiguously concern themselves with the differences
between individuals with autism.
Inter-personal difference may take various forms. Differences may arise because
individuals have qualitatively distinct symptoms to one another; the presence or
absence of repetitive behaviours or sensory difficulties, for example. Such a
situation is described by a Professor who acknowledges that ‘sensory sensi-
tivities’ do ‘aggregate’ with the ‘problems in social reciprocity and communi-
cation’ typically found in autism, but who also insists that there are a number
of children who are part of the ‘domain of autistic behaviour’ who do not
have these problems:
But I mean you do get this, these things (.) they tend to aggregate (.) but you,
you, we, we would argue, we, we also see a lot of kids with very typical pro-
blems in social reciprocity and communication, erm, who don’t have the
restrictive, repetitive behaviours and specific interests and s’, sensory sensi-
tivities and so on, that use, that are, are, p’, p’, part of the, you know, of that
domain of autistic behaviour. Erm, (.) so, anyway, whatever’s going on I
would suggest it’s got multiple aetiologies . . . (Professor, interview 13)
Autism may, then, be qualitatively different in different individuals, the result of
‘multiple aetiologies’. Alternatively, inter-personal difference may be theorised as
an issue of severity, individuals being on different ‘parts of the spectrum’.
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Regardless of the particular hypothesis, the defining issue here is of differences
between individuals.
By comparison, intra-individual heterogeneity refers to the claim that there are
different causes of autism within an individual person. For example, it might be
claimed that the causative factors behind communication deficits are fundamen-
tally different to the causative factors behind repetitive behaviours. Such a dis-
course of intra-personal heterogeneity was also prominent within the interviews
and is nicely expressed in the following extract. This Assistant Professor has advo-
cated a theory of autism known as the social reward hypothesis (see Chevallier
et al., 2012 for details) which argues that, rather than being unable to understand
other agents, individuals with autism are simply not motivated to do so. The
Assistant Professor is asked how such a hypothesis might explain apparently
non-social aspects of autism such as restricted interests or repetitive behaviours:
Well (.) the, there is no direct, erm, there is no direct way where the social, er,
reward hypothesis will have a prediction for higher or lower social, er, lower
repetitive behaviour . . . it appears that these two aspects of autism may have
different aetiologies so they happen to co-exist in various cases but, erm,
there wouldn’t be a single phenomenon that could explain both at the
same time, erm, (.) from the looks of it, from, from the looks of the factor
analyses that have been done . . . I mean I think it’s, it’s almost a wrong ques-
tion to ask, whether, say, for example, the enhanced perceptual function
model which, er, erm, I, which erm, erm, [Laurent] Mottron, er, and Kate
Plaisted-Grant, er, talk about (.) whether, to ask those perceptual based
models that whether they can explain the social phenomenon or to ask a
social motivation type, a social based model to ask whether they can
explain the perceptual, I mean, why do we need a single explanation? We,
we don’t. (Assistant Professor, interview 6)
We can see here that, despite also advocating a form of autistic heterogeneity, this
form of heterogeneity is quite different to that described in the previous extracts.
Here, individual differences are not mentioned. Instead, ‘two aspects of autism’—
‘social’ and ‘repetitive’ behaviours—have ‘different aetiologies’ but ‘co-exist’ in
certain individuals. Indeed, the study of autism has advanced to the point where
the question has to be asked ‘why do we need a single explanation’—the
answer is that ‘we don’t’. Exactly the same point is made by a Research Fellow
in the extract below. This research fellow suggests that there are ‘two distinct
things’ within an individual with autism:
I find it hard to explain all of the social components with non-social com-
ponents so I wonder whether there’s two distinct things, erm, that have to
coincide for you to have autism but they are distinct. (Research Fellow, inter-
view 12)
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These findings of intra-personal heterogeneity have led many researchers to reach
the conclusion that there is no ‘single psychological deficit’ and that ‘more of a
mix’ of theories is required to explain autism. As a second Research Fellow states:
. . . people are more accepting of the idea that you don’t have a single psycho-
logical deficit. So the days of weak central coherence versus executive func-
tioning versus theory of mind seem to be gone, and people are understanding
more that there’s much more of a mix. (Research Fellow, interview 4)
Within the present extracts, and in clear contrast to the autism scientists studied
by Decoteau and Underman (2015), autism is constructed as being hetero-
geneous both intra-individual and inter-individual in nature. Such a conden-
sation of heterogeneity from a multi-faceted to a singular concept is
consistent with the conclusions of Shackley and Wynne, discussed during the
analytic perspective, who suggest that in order to make uncertainties more tract-
able, there is an (almost certainly unwitting) process of transformation that
‘occurs when different types of uncertainty are represented as faithfully captured
by one designation’ (Shackley and Wynne, 1996, p. 283). By understanding
autistic heterogeneity as a singular quality of autism, scientists may well
glean a clarity that would be impossible if heterogeneity were explicitly recog-
nised in all its complexity.
Indeterminacy as Uncertainty Work
Thus far I have detailed the ways in which psychologists and neuroscientists
describe themselves as facing, in addition to both epistemological and ontologi-
cal uncertainties, a condition which is indeterminate by its very nature. Autistic
heterogeneity is, I have suggested, exogenous to science, intractable, and con-
fronts autism research at every turn. In this final section I will consider the
inter-relations between epistemic uncertainty, ontological uncertainty, and inde-
terminacy. I argue that claims of autism’s indeterminacy can be understood to
be, at least on occasion, a form of uncertainty work. Much as others have
suggested that scientists sometime work to displace uncertainty, shifting it
away from their own field into other disciplines (Pinch, 1981, p. 155; Shackley
and Wynne, 1996, p. 290), I suggest here that understanding persisting uncer-
tainties as being attributable to an indeterminate condition may make research
doable and failures comprehensible.
One Associate Professor, for example, states that: ‘ . . . I think one of the things
we do know about autism is how heterogeneous it is, I mean it’s just ridiculous’
(Associate Professor, interview 11). According to this Associate Professor it is not
the case that the apparent failure of the cognitive sciences (or some allied disci-
pline) to locate the unitary essence of autism is a failing on its part, as suggested
by notions of epistemic and ontological uncertainty. Rather, because ‘ . . . it’s quite
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hard to tar everybody with the same brush in something that’s so, erm, hetero-
geneous as autism’ (Postdoctoral Researcher, interview 19), it is in the nature
of autism to elude the descriptions of psychologists.
A further Postdoctoral Researcher makes similar claims in the following
extract. I asked the researcher why, given the theoretical and empirical resources
devoted to the issue, there are so few certainties in relation to what autism ‘is’ and
what ‘causes’ it. This Postdoctoral Researcher quickly put questions of uncertainty
into discussion with those of indeterminacy:
I: Mm hm, yeah. So, I mean, it’s quite striking I think that, still, er, despite that we have
these, clearly very sophisticated, models and some very sophisticated methods as
well, that there’s still a lot of disagreement about, erm, what causes autism and
what autism is. Erm, what, why do you think that there remains such a degree of dis-
agreement, erm, when we’ve stud’, studying this condition for quite a long time
now?
PD: (.) Yeah. (.) Yeah. Well (.). I think one thing about it is the heterogeneity. (Postdoc-
toral Researcher, interview 9)
Uncertainty and indeterminacy do not, then, stand separate in the reports of
working scientists; the indeterminate nature of autism is instead used to explain
the presence of epistemic and ontological uncertainty. Repeatedly, when asked
why psychological research has so frequently contradicted itself in terms of
research findings, it was claimed that ‘heterogeneity’s probably the biggest
barrier and the biggest explanation for why it’s messy’ (Associate Professor, inter-
view 11). Here, heterogeneity is not a construct of science but ‘the biggest barrier’
to science. This is made abundantly clear in the following extract from a Research
Fellow:
. . . So, (.) yeah I guess because of all of that heterogeneity (.) that just makes
it a much harder disorder to work with. Erm, and harder to get to the core
component, whatever level they happen to be at, erm, because of the hetero-
geneity, it’s really just getting in the way of us advancing so, although we’ve
got a huge amount of autism research in the literature now and a huge
amount of money’s been pumped into it in the last ten, twenty years, I
think we still don’t have enough to really (.) we haven’t gone far enough
with it. (Research Fellow, Interview 5)
Again, heterogeneity is ‘getting in the way of us advancing’ and making it ‘harder
to get to the core component’ of autism. It is, once again, in the nature of autism to
resist scientific investigation. The reason, I suggest, that this can be seen as a form
of uncertainty work is that by constructing heterogeneity as a core component of
autism, responsibility is shifted from culture and to nature. Indeed, as other
research has shown (McGoey, 2009; Mellor, 2010; McGoey, 2012) and as this
interview extract hints at, scientists might even be able to leverage more research
226 G. Hollin
funding as a result of this uncertainty; harder problems require more resources and
‘we still don’t have enough’.
Conclusion
This first question asked in this article was: how do scientists understand the
uncertainties surrounding autism. Existing work (Star, 1985; Pickersgill, 2011)
has shown that ‘uncertainty’ can mean many things and this article finds
support for that conclusion, detailing two quite different forms of uncertainty dis-
cussed during the interviews. Firstly, epistemic uncertainty suggests that a pro-
liferation of methods and techniques have led to disparate results which have
proven hard to reconcile. Secondly, ontological uncertainty suggests that the
label autism may not reflect a discrete, homogenous population. I also showed
that scientists, grappling with these uncertainties and a complex clinical entity,
engaged in forms of ‘uncertainty work’; strategies which make their research
doable in the face of uncertainty (e.g. Pinch, 1981).
In the second portion of the article I addressed a further question concerning the
relationship between these aforementioned uncertainties and the argument made
by some scientists that autism is indeterminate. During the interviews, discussion
of indeterminacy centres on the notion of autistic heterogeneity. Autistic hetero-
geneity refers, variously, to differences between individuals (inter-personal het-
erogeneity) and the inability to find a common cause for all symptoms within a
particular individual (intra-individual heterogeneity). I showed that on occasion
scientists put indeterminacy and heterogeneity into discussion with uncertainty,
explaining that they are uncertain precisely because autism is indeterminate.
Thus, rather than a well policed boundary between the epistemic (uncertainty)
on one side and the ontological (indeterminacy) on the other, there is a movement
between, and an entwinement of, the two.
I would like to conclude by noting the two contributions of this piece. The first
contribution is of utility to those with a broad interest in uncertainty and uncer-
tainty work in science. The existing literature has consistently emphasised that
researchers look to their tools and taxonomies as they attempt to understand uncer-
tainty. The corpus has, thus, largely restricted itself to discussions of epistemology
(although see Moreira et al., 2009; Pickersgill, 2011 for exceptions). This is most
evident in those pieces which focus upon antiepistemologies (Galison, 2004)
wherein deliberate attempts are made to obscure the true picture. While no such
claims of obfuscation are made here, significant support has been found for exist-
ing typologies of uncertainty (Star, 1985; Pickersgill, 2011) and uncertainty work
(Pinch, 1981; Shackley and Wynne, 1996). This piece has also, however,
suggested that ‘indeterminacy work’—which explicitly concerns not tools or
typologies but ontology and objects of analysis—may play an important role
and that the boundary between uncertainty and indeterminacy is sometimes
hard to police. This finding offers a significant potential avenue of future work
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and suggested that a much fuller discussion of indeterminacy and indeterminacy
work is required in order to fully grasp uncertainty in scientific research.
The second contribution, here, builds upon this first point. While, as noted pre-
viously, audience and context is crucial to understanding discussion pertaining to
uncertainty, it is important to note that this construction of autism as indeterminate
goes beyond the interview setting. The claim that it is ‘time to give up on a single
explanation for autism’ (Happe´ et al., 2006) is now widespread and it has recently
been suggested that autism be characterised by ‘the idiosyncratic brain’ (Hahamy
et al., 2015). This analysis is among the first to take autistic heterogeneity
seriously, to work through what it actually ‘is’ and examine what it may be
doing in the talk and practice of scientists. I have argued that the practices of scien-
tists—their experimentation on and theorisation of autistic heterogeneity—have
been both performative and productive, having material consequences that have
changed the nature of autism. If this is so, if ontology and epistemology cannot
be so easily parsed, then all with a stake in autism need to take heterogeneity
seriously and to examine its ethical, epistemic, and ontological consequences.
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